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Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have the potential
to increase road safety and comfort. Especially because of
the road safety functions, there is a strong demand for secu-
rity in VANETs. After defining three application categories
the paper outlines main security and privacy requirements
in VANETs. Next, a security architecture for VANETs (SAV)
is proposed that strives to satisfy the requirements. To find
mechanisms applicable in the architecture a survey of exist-
ing mechanisms is given.
1 Introduction
In 2001 the European Union committed to reduce traf-
fic victims until 2010 to the half of the victims in the year
2000 [9]. One component to reach this goal is active road
safety (prevention of accidents). Common methods in this
area are ABS (Anti-lock Braking System) or ESP (Elec-
tronic Stability Program). Another method is ADAS (Ad-
vanced Driver-Assistance Systems) where vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) are subordinated to.
More technically VANETs are a subgroup of mobile ad
hoc networks (MANETs, defined in [22]). The main dif-
ference is that the mobile routers building the network are
vehicles like cars or trucks and their movement is restricted
by factors like road course, encompassing traffic and traf-
fic regulations. It is a feasible assumption that the members
of VANETs can connect to fixed networks like the Internet
occasionally, at least at regular service intervals. A main
goal of VANETs is to increase road safety. To achieve this
goal the vehicles act as sensors and inform each other about
abnormal and potentially hazardous traffic conditions like
accidents, traffic jams or glaze.
The messages exchanged in the VANET influence the
behavior of the drivers. Depending on the information they
get they will e.g. drive very carefully and slowly in the case
of a glaze warning or choose an alternate route in the case
they are informed about a traffic jam on their desired route.
Adversaries could exploit this by injecting wrong messages
and slowing down traffic or getting a vehicle-free road. To
prevent this kind of misuse security is very important in
VANETs.
After defining three application categories and deriving
security and privacy requirements in section 2 this paper
outlines a security architecture for VANETs (SAV) which
strives to prevent attacks and enables the participants to
communicate in a secure manner while also protecting their
privacy. In section 4 a survey on existing approaches is done
to find suitable mechanisms to use in the architecture.
2 Application Categories and Requirements
2.1 Application Categories
In this section we define three main categories of appli-
cations in VANETs. The categorization is done with respect
to security and privacy issues as well as communication re-
quirements.
Telematics Messages and Warnings: The vehicles ex-
change messages to inform each other about events and dan-
gers on the road. The messages include information derived
from the car sensors (ABS, ESP, etc.), like a recognized full
stop or aquaplaning, the usage of an airbag, current speed
and acceleration or deceleration as well as sending time and
position. Even traffic jams or congestions can be identified
by aggregating and interpreting these messages. Besides in-
formation exchange between vehicles, stationary transmit-
ters (e.g. SOS-telephones) can be used to extend range or
provide access to other networks.
According to [30] there are two technical possibilities for
such a telematics system:
1. Passive: All vehicles periodically broadcast messages
with their current status (beacons) and forward such
messages if necessary. Based on rules each vehicle
decides independently how to react to the information.
The quality of these rules defines the effectiveness of
the system.
2. Active: A vehicle only sends messages if it recognizes
a problem or has to forward a message. The effec-
tiveness of the system depends mainly on the problem
recognition.
The main drawbacks of the passive approach are the need
for more bandwidth and computing power and the fact that
creation of movement profiles is easier. The big advantages
are that more situations can be recognized and anomaly de-
tection is easier because the data of all surrounding vehicles
is available.
In this category the security requirements are high be-
cause the data sent in beacons and warnings influences the
behavior of the drivers. It should for example be impossi-
ble to replay or modify messages. In addition, privacy is
an issue because the data sent could – especially in the case
of periodically sent beacons – easily be used for movement
profile creation. The addressees are unknown – all vehicles
in a given region (e.g. all vehicles not more than 20 km
behind the scene of an accident) are addressed. Sending a
message to addressees in a given geographic area is known
as geocasting [20].
Alarm Signals: This application category mainly ad-
dresses electronic alarm signals from emergency vehicles
(police cars, fire engines, ambulances, etc.) in action. By
sending its current position, time and destination or desired
route, the other vehicles can (and must) clear the way for
the emergency vehicle. By forwarding the alarm signals the
time to react for the other vehicles further increases. In ad-
dition, it is possible to influence the behavior of infrastruc-
ture like traffic lights to grant the emergency vehicle free
drive. [6] suggests a secure communication protocol for the
special case of influencing the state of a traffic light.
In this category the security requirements are very high
because the data sent directly influences the behavior of the
drivers and infrastructure. It should for example be im-
possible to replay or modify messages because then adver-
saries could clear their way like emergency vehicles. Pri-
vacy is normally not an issue here but the addresses have
to know for sure that the message originates from an autho-
rized source. Again addressees are unknown and geocasting
is used.
Value-added Services: There are numerous services to
think of in a VANET. These services mainly depend on uni-
cast messages to an already known communication partner
and include location based services like finding an alterna-
tive route, the next hotel or restaurant as well as other ser-
vices like providing Internet access. The security and pri-
vacy requirements range from low to high depending on the
service. In contrast to the other categories this is end-to-end
communication (in most cases over multiple hops) and the
user has no obligation to use the service. The priority is
comparatively low.
2.2 Requirements
The following enumeration of security and privacy re-
quirements is based on a more detailed analysis of the ap-
plication categories that is omitted here due to space limita-
tions.
Integrity
1. Integrity for all messages should be protected to pre-
vent adversaries from altering them.
2. Authentication is needed to keep outsiders1 from in-
jecting messages.
3. A reliable time source is needed to guard against
replay-attacks and a reliable positioning system is
needed to prevent position spoofing.
Confidentiality
4. The privacy of users should be protected to prevent cre-
ation of movement and usage profiles and to protect
users’ identity.
5. The messages should be encrypted to prevent outsiders
from gaining information from the value-added ser-
vices.
Availability
6. To reach all necessary recipients that may even be un-
known to the sender an adequate routing protocol is
needed. Also some messages (e.g. an ice warning)
have to be kept in a specified location for a specified
time.
7. Because of the urgency of traffic information low la-
tency is a must for the communication.
8. Scalability is also an issue given some 50 million ve-
hicles only in Germany [25].
To be able to prosecute misuse non-repudiation is neces-
sary but this bears (besides others) the danger of automated
traffic surveillance. Therefore, when designing a security
mechanism there should be the possibility to identify the
sender of a message but this identification should not be al-
lowed in an automated and easy fashion.
1Outsiders are entities that are not valid participants of the VANET, e.g.
residents that profit by or are at a disadvantage by certain road courses.
3 Security Architecture
After introducing our communication model this section
outlines a security architecture for VANETs (SAV).
Communication model. We suggest a hybrid telematics
system where each vehicle periodically sends beacons (pas-
sive). If it recognizes a potentially dangerous traffic event
by combining and interpreting the beacons of other vehicles
and in-car sensor data, explicit warnings are sent (active).
I.e. the two approaches mentioned on page 1 are combined
and there is no need to forward beacons because of the ex-
plicit warning messages. Beacons are just sent single hop.
The warning messages are spread over multiple hops in a
specified region depending on the type of the traffic event.
To lower network traffic the beacons of the hybrid telem-
atics system should be combined with messages needed by
the routing algorithm. Therefore a beacon contains all infor-
mation needed by the routing algorithm as well as enough
information for the hybrid telematics system to decide if
there is a dangerous situation. More concretely it has to
contain the pseudonym, position, current time and move-
ment (direction, speed and acceleration or deceleration) of
the sending vehicle at a minimum. The sending interval
should be variable to reduce network traffic or to be able to
comply with conditions like speed, communication range,
etc. as suggested in [28] and [27].
SAV consists of three layers shown in Fig. 1. The bottom
layer includes basic security elements that are used in the
other layers. The second layer (single-hop-security) shows
how the beacons are secured that are in most cases the first
contact between vehicles and therefore build the basis for
further communication. The multi-hop layer includes all
other applications, services, etc. used in the VANET.
Basic security elements. As fundamental security mech-
anism we suggest to employ a centralized public key infras-
tructure (PKI) with a trusted third party (TTP) what is moti-
vated in more detail in section 4.3. All vehicles get – prefer-
ably at production time – the root certificate of the TTP and
pseudonym certificates with corresponding key pairs that
are stored in tamper proof hardware. We assume that there
are enough pseudonyms to be able to protect the privacy of
the participants. Emergency vehicles get certificates with
an additional attribute that certifies their special role. The
question if the certificates should be bound to persons, ve-
hicles or both is not yet answered but does not affect the
overall functionality. Additionally, each vehicle needs the
ability to determine its current time and position in a reli-
able manner.
Single-Hop-Security. As stated above the beacons are the









































Figure 1. Security Architecture
able to implement security mechanisms at a higher level it
has to be ensured that the receiver of a beacon has the ability
to verify the integrity of the beacon as well as to identify the
sender as a valid participant of the VANET.
To be able to do so, we employ the PKI of the basic secu-
rity layer. Each sending vehicle S digitally signs its beacons
and sends them in conjunction with its certificateCertS that
is used for the digital signature. The receiving vehicle R
uses CertS (and the root certificate of the TTP) to test if S
is a valid participant of the VANET2. Then the signature in
conjunction with CertS is used to verify that the given bea-
con is really from S (authentication and non-repudiation)
and has not been changed (integrity). The freshness of the
beacon is proved by the time included in the beacon. After
this R can be sure that he communicates with S. For per-
formance reasons he should add CertS to a neighborhood
table for a specific time3. After S has checked R’s beacons
in the same way S andR can communicate in a secure man-
ner. If confidentiality is an issue they can encrypt messages
with the public key included in the certificate of the com-
munication partner. For performance reasons the validity of
the certificate just needs to be checked if it is not already in
the neighborhood table.
Because asymmetric cryptography is very costly in terms
of computing time and beacons are sent relatively often,
we propose a hybrid variation of the above protocol: Af-
ter the certificate exchange the two neighbors can securely
exchange a secret symmetric key that is saved in the neigh-
borhood table, too. This secret key is used together with a
2We assume that anybody with a valid certificate is allowed to partici-
pate in the VANET.
3The time depends on traffic conditions (like current speed, vehicle
density, etc.).
message authentication code (MAC) to provide integrity of
the beacons. The asymmetric digital signature is not neces-
sary any more. This hybrid variation also has some draw-
backs: The integrity check can only be done after a secret
key is exchanged with each neighbor. A unique MAC has to
be computed for each neighbor what needs additional time
and bandwidth. The possible optimization to use the same
symmetric key for all neighbors results in completely loos-
ing non-repudiation what is not desirable. If the pure asym-
metric or the hybrid variant is more efficient depends on
the frequency of neighbor changes, the absolute amount of
neighbors and the cryptography algorithms used.
Periodically sent beacons with position and time infor-
mation enable external eavesdroppers to create movement
profiles. To protect against this, the beacons could be en-
crypted and should not give away information about the
sender or receiver. To encrypt the messages one could use
the public keys or the secret symmetric keys of the hybrid
variant, respectively. A problem is that the eavesdropper
would still get to know any new neighbors, because these
have to send their certificates in plain text before being able
to encrypt communication with the existing neighbors.
To overcome this problem, each new neighbor N could
send a couple – say x – of other certificates in addition to his
own certificate. The existing neighbors then would have to
encrypt all messages with all public keys (or in the hybrid
variant have to encrypt at least the new symmetric keys with
all public keys). The attacker then only knows that one of
the x+1 vehicles has joined. The x+1 certificates build the
anonymity group for N.
In summary, digitally signing each message greatly im-
proves security and prevents outsiders from injecting bogus
information. Encryption imposes a lot of overhead and in-
creases the time to react to a dangerous situation because
before being able to read a beacon, the certificates (and
probably keys) have to be exchanged and the message has to
be decrypted. We think road safety is more important here
than the additional protection against the creation of move-
ment profiles by non-participants and therefore discourage
encryption at this level. Instead, the privacy of the users
is protected by complicating the creation of movement pro-
files by regularly changing pseudonyms (see 4.4 for more
details).
Multi-Hop-Security. This layer is applicable for alarm
signals, warnings and value-added services. There are the
following options for end-to-end security:
• In the case of uni- or multicast, certificates can be ex-
changed with the communication partners. These can
be used for asymmetric cryptography or the exchange
of symmetric keys. A problem may be pseudonym
changes because messages may get lost after the
change.
• In the case of geocast, asymmetric cryptography is a
must. Because the recipients of the message are un-
known, there is no way to exchange certificates or keys
with them. Therefore encryption is not possible here.
The digital signature provides at least authentication,
non-repudiation and integrity.
A possibility to protect the exact position of the sender of
a geocast message relevant for vehicles further away (like
a traffic jam warning) is spatial cloaking – the obfuscation
of the exact position information. Addressees very near to
the traffic jam need the exact position (e.g. “behind the
next curve”), whereas addressees 50 km away just need to
know between which exits of the highway the traffic jam
is located to be able to choose an alternative route (exam-
ple from [29]). The cloaking can be done in various ways,
one of the simplest is adding a random distance to the exact
position information in dependence of the addressed geo-
graphical region. I.e. vehicles further away get less reliable
position information. More on cloaking can be found in
[14]. This method is not suitable for all geocast messages.
E.g. alarm signals must contain the exact position informa-
tion to enable the other vehicles to prepare for the arrival of
the emergency vehicle in time.
Further Aspects. The aggregation and interpretation of
beacons can lead to a warning message in case of a poten-
tially dangerous situation. Therefore the hybrid telematics
system depends on the cooperation and trustworthiness of
the participants. The same is true for the routing protocol.
Insiders (entities that are valid participants of the VANET)
trying to actively interfere the protocols are very dangerous
adversaries. To defend against these we suggest using tam-
per proof hardware as platform for the telematics and rout-
ing algorithms. As for the telematics system beacons that
triggered a warning message should be saved by the sender
of the warning message to be able to prosecute the injection
of bogus information.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) should check if
messages are forwarded on the technical layer. In addi-
tion, it should check if the information received is feasi-
ble. This check can be done by employing data deliv-
ered from sensors inside the vehicle or information received
from other participants of the VANET. If an adversary in-
side the VANET is detected who does not forward messages
or injects bogus information, this information (including ev-
idence like the in-car sensor data) should be forwarded to
the TTP. Then the TTP can decide if the adversary’s certifi-
cate should be revoked with the consequence that the ad-
versary is no longer able to participate in the VANET. This
mechanism requires that the participants regularly update
the certificate revocation list (CRL) from the TTP or have
other means to check the validity of a certificate.
To reduce latency for important messages (like beacons,
warning messages and alarm signals) a priority scheme that
prefers this type of message could easily be added. To
be able to protect against the creation of movement pro-
files by insiders and outsiders we suggest to use changing
pseudonyms. One must not forget that identifiers on all
communication layers must be changed when pseudonyms
are changed. An example of such an identifier could be the
medium access control address of the wireless protocol or
even a typical packet size or RF-fingerprint caused by the
hardware [5].
Evaluation. Integrity is ensured in single-hop as well as
multi-hop messages. Also, all messages are authenticated
and there is the possibility to encrypt messages (req. 1,
2 and 5). In addition, non-repudiation is guaranteed by
employing a digital signature. It is not possible for out-
siders to inject bogus information or to reuse old messages
for a replay attack. If the algorithms are implemented in
tamper proof hardware even valid participants cannot ac-
tively manipulate the communication. Pseudonyms protect
the identities of the participants. By creating appropriate
policies at the TTP even law enforcement could not easily
get to know the identity of a given VANET participant. If
pseudonym changes are done in an appropriate manner cre-
ation of movement and usage profiles is prevented (req. 4).
Scalability (req. 8) was considered when suggesting a PKI.
Requirements 3, 6 and 7 can not be fulfilled solely by the
security architecture. We will address this issue after the
survey on existing mechanisms.
4 Existing Mechanisms
Zarki et al. [31] probably published the first paper deal-
ing with security in VANETs. Other existing publications
on security in VANETs cover single aspects like PKI [7, 24]
or secure position sensing and privacy [16]. [23] gives
an overview on security flaws and solutions. This section
briefly evaluates existing mechanisms that could be em-
ployed in the proposed security architecture.
4.1 Assumptions
No special wireless technology is needed underlining
the independence of the security architecture. Nevertheless
dedicated short range communications (DSRC) is expected
because it is explicitly designed for VANETs, supported by
US and European car manufacturer consortia and standard-
ized as IEEE 802.11p WAVE (wireless access for vehicular
environments).
Vehicles are cars and trucks. Motorbikes or other road
users like pedestrians are not taken into consideration to
prevent restrictions on hardware. The VANET will not op-
erate in a standalone fashion but be supplemented by some
infrastructure like traffic lights or dedicated hardware like
S0S-telephones that play the role of message repeaters. Ac-
cess to a stationary network is – at least temporarily – pos-
sible. It is expected that data inside vehicles is reliable. Es-
pecially the sensor data is expected to be correct.
Requirement 6 cannot be satisfied by the security archi-
tecture. Therefore we assume that there exists a secure rout-
ing protocol and a mechanism to keep messages in a spec-
ified geographic region. Nevertheless we briefly examine
these issues in the following.
Routing. Routing protocols can be categorized in
topology-based and position-based routing algorithms. A
main advantage of position-based routing is that it supports
geocasting. [12, 11, 18] found that position-based routing is
also superior to topology-based routing in VANETs in terms
of delivery rate, additional network load and latency.
Now we want to outline the requirements for a good
VANET routing protocol:
• Functional requirements
1. Has low latency.
2. Is capable of uni-, broad-, multi- and especially
geocasting.
3. Guarantees delivery or at least a high delivery
rate.
4. Considers the specific VANET topology (streets,
node destination, etc.).
5. Causes low additional network load.
• Security and privacy requirements
6. Protects from active attacks like the injection of
wrong routing information.
7. Protects from passive attacks like black hole at-
tacks.
8. Protects the position information of the nodes.
9. Allows anonymity or pseudonymity.
10. Protects from or at least complicates the creation
of movement profiles and traffic analysis.
In our analysis we could not find a routing protocol that
fulfills all requirements. There are routing protocols that
fully satisfy the security requirements (e.g. ASR [33]) but
these lack functional requirements or make assumptions
that are impractical in VANETs (e.g. there must be a shared
secret between source and destination in the case of ASR).
Some protocols try to find a compromise between secu-
rity and functional requirements (e.g. AODV-SEC [8] or
SPAAR [4]) but these don’t support geocasting what is es-
sential in a VANET. Spatially aware routing (SAR, [27])
from the CarTalk2000 project fully satisfies the functional
requirements but does not fulfill any security requirements.
There seems to be no good routing protocol to use at the
moment.
Regional Alerts. There are mainly two approaches to
keep regional alert messages in a specified geographic
region for a specified time: Stationary transmitters that
periodically repeat the message and BiPP (Bidirectional
Perimeter-based Propagation, [26]) that just needs the co-
operation of the VANET participants.
Stationary transmitters are more reliable than BiPP but
we don’t expect the necessary infrastructure in the near fu-
ture because of high costs. Therefore we suggest using
BiPP that can be used without additional costs. Neverthe-
less BiPP should be modified in a way that it is able to
use stationary transmitters when available. Then the reli-
ability and efficiency of the regional alert system could be
increased by deploying stationary transmitters at positions
that are potentially highly dangerous.
4.2 Positioning and Time
Each participant should be able to determine his current
position and the current time correctly and provable. No-
body should be able to forge a position and nobody should
get to know the position and identity of a participant un-
less the participant tells him. The time needed to determine
the position should be very short because of the real time
constraints of the VANET.
[3] introduces SPA (self-positioning-algorithm), a semi
autonomous algorithm that enables the nodes in an ad hoc
network to determine their position relative to each other
without the need for additional infrastructure. No state-
ments about the security of and the time needed by the al-
gorithm could be found in the literature. Therefore it can
not be recommended here. Another approach named veri-
fiable multilateration is introduced in [16]. This approach
employs a fixed trusted infrastructure to verify positions by
triangulation. This fixed infrastructure has to be very dense
what makes this approach very costly. Also there is no in-
formation available about the time needed to complete the
algorithm. Therefore it can not be recommended here, too.
The most practical way to fulfill the requirements is us-
ing GALILEO, the European satellite navigation system
that is expected to start operation in 2008. It needs no
additional stationary infrastructure and the Safety of Live
Service (SoL) guarantees an availability of 99,8%, a pre-
cision of 4-6m and additional integrity information. Com-
bined with the built-in authentication mechanism certified
receivers can prove the authenticity of the information [10].
The additional information to test integrity and authen-
ticity can not protect from all attacks. An attacker might be
able to delay the satellite signals what leads to a wrong com-
putation of the position and time. Nevertheless this attack
is a lot more difficult than forging GPS information.
4.3 Public Key Infrastructure
There are different proposals how to implement a PKI
in ad hoc networks. For example, [15] suggests a solu-
tion similar to PGP and [32] suggests a decentralized PKI
based on threshold cryptography. Both are not applicable
in VANETs. In the first proposal it is not guaranteed that a
certificate can be verified. This is not acceptable especially
in the case of alarm signals. In the threshold schema a lot of
participants have to work together to issue new certificates.
This could not be expected in a VANET with numerous par-
ticipants not knowing each other.
As stated above VANETs are usually hybrid networks
with the possibility to access a stationary network at least
temporarily. Therefore we suggest to use an “ordinary” cen-
tralized PKI approach with a TTP that issues certificates and
revokes them. Two promising proposals how to implement
such a PKI are LKN-ASF (LKN Ad hoc Security Frame-
work, [24]) and MANET-IDs in conjunction with MANET-
CRS [17]. Because of the fact that LKN-ASF already has
proved good performance in simulations (see [24, 7]) we
prefer this approach and will do some deeper analysis on
this in the near future.
4.4 Pseudonymity
To be able to prevent creation of movement or usage
profiles we suggest using role based pseudonyms. By em-
ploying roles the participants can distinguish between “or-
dinary” participants and privileged participants like police
cars or fire fighters in action. Each participant needs a
couple of pseudonyms for his “ordinary” participant role
that should be unlinkable. Using randomly generated
transaction pseudonyms would be a possibility to ensure
anonymity. But in VANETs non-repudiation is a must be-
cause otherwise insiders could inject faked messages with-
out having to fear punishment like exclusion from the
VANET. Therefore a trusted third party (TTP) has to is-
sue pseudonyms that the participants change regularly. Now
just the TTP and law enforcement (in the case of prosecu-
tion) is able to find out the identity for a given pseudonym
and get to know the other pseudonyms corresponding to the
identity. All other adversaries cannot create movement or
usage profiles if the pseudonyms are unlinkable.
Linkability – in this context mainly depending on the
question when pseudonyms should be changed and who
should initiate the change – is a problem in VANETs, es-
pecially if unencrypted telematics messages are exchanged
very frequently that contain exact position information. In
this case an adversary could use statistical methods to link
the pseudonyms. A method to complicate this attack are
MIX-zones first mentioned in [1]. Problems with MIX-
zones especially in the case of VANETs and some other so-
lution possibilities to achieve unlinkability are discussed in
[5]. But one should not forget that even without a VANET it
is possible to physically follow a vehicle to create a move-
ment profile. In the case of warnings and messages sent over
multiple-hops the position information could be cloaked to
hamper profile creation (see section on multi-hop-security).
4.5 Intrusion Detection
[17] gives a good overview on existing proposals like
Watchdog and Pathrater [19], CONFIDANT [2], CORE
[21] and others. In addition, it develops MobIDS (mobile
intrusion detection system) an IDS architecture for mobile
ad hoc networks. MobIDS is suitable for VANETs and
makes some sophisticated suggestions on detecting nodes
not correctly forwarding messages and informing the TTP
about malicious behavior. The detection process is based
on an improved version of the Watchdog approach and a
probing process. A Watchdog W listens to all traffic in
promiscuous mode (promiscuous overhearing) and there-
fore is able to check if a node N in range really forwards
messages that are intended for forwarding. In the probing
process the nodes on the route are explicitly probed by send-
ing them messages to forward. This two “sensors” con-
tribute (among some others) to a local rating of the other
nodes that can lead to local reactions like avoiding certain
nodes or discarding messages from them. In addition, the
local rating is shared with other instances of MobIDS and
combined to a global rating. If the global rating of a node
becomes too poor he may be excluded from the network
completely. For further information see [17].
This “technical” intrusion detection should be combined
with the “semantic” detection of wrong information in bea-
cons and warnings. [13] proposes a general approach how
to validate VANET data, i.e. how to check if the informa-
tion contained in beacons and warnings from other vehicles
is feasible. This proposal should be integrated in MobIDS.
In addition, evidence for malicious behavior has to be saved
and submitted to the TTP. This evidence could be beacons
and in-car sensor data that triggered a warning message,
suspicious warning messages from other VANET partici-
pants or the like.
5 Discussion and Future Work
So far existing approaches focused on single aspects of
VANET security. This paper defines security and privacy re-
quirements and outlines a comprehensive security architec-
ture that enables various applications and satisfies the key
requirements. The requirements an architecture cannot ful-
fill seem to be satisfiable by plugging existing or modified
mechanisms in the architecture.
Section 4 shows numerous existing mechanisms that fit
in the proposed security architecture. For example reli-
able time and position information (req. 3) is achievable by
employing a certified GALILEO receiver. There are some
good proposals on how to implement PKI and IDS but these
have to be adjusted and refined to help to fulfill all VANET
requirements. The main problem seems to find a secure
routing algorithm with geocasting capabilities. With BiPP
there exists at least a good protocol to keep warnings in a
specified region for a specified time.
We are currently evaluating existing mechanisms appli-
cable in the security architecture and try to improve them.
Thereby we focus on exactly specifying a PKI and develop-
ing a secure routing protocol with geocasting capabilities.
To prevent abuse of the VANET, we try to develop a system
that encourages cooperation and punishes uncooperative be-
havior. In summary, we try to fill the architecture with ex-
actly specified mechanisms to be able to test scalability and
latency in simulations.
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